Innovation is a Process: The Diamond Model

Diamond process

Divergent Ideation, Convergent Prioritization

Most organizations treat innovation like lightning. They wait for it to strike, celebrate it when it does, and wonder what went wrong during the long dry spells in between. That posture is understandable; we have been culturally conditioned to associate innovation with flashes of brilliance, lone geniuses, and garage-startup mythology. But it is also dangerously wrong, because it makes innovation feel like something that happens to an organization rather than something an organization does.

Innovation is a process. It can be designed, facilitated, and repeated. And the organizations that figure this out will run circles around those still staring at the sky waiting for inspiration.

At Innovation Vista, we have spent years refining how mid-market companies move from vague ambition to concrete, prioritized innovation portfolios. The core of that process is what we call the Diamond model: a deliberate expansion of possibilities followed by a disciplined narrowing toward the highest-impact investments. It’s an adaptation of the British Design Council’s “Double Diamond” design process model, and the divergence-convergence model proposed by Hungarian-American linguist Béla H. Bánáthy.

Think of it as the shape a diamond makes when viewed from the side: a point that widens, reaches its broadest span, and then converges back to a point. The left half is divergent thinking. The right half is convergent thinking. Both are essential, and the most common mistake organizations make is collapsing them into a single meeting where the loudest voice in the room wins.

 

Why the Shape Matters

The Diamond is not just a metaphor; it is a sequencing discipline. Divergent thinking and convergent thinking are fundamentally different cognitive modes, and they interfere with each other when they occupy the same room at the same time.

Here is what typically happens in a strategy session at a mid-market company: the CEO or CIO poses a question (“How should we use AI?” or “What should our technology roadmap look like?”), the room goes quiet for a moment, and then the most senior person offers an opinion. Within minutes, the conversation gravitates toward that opinion; not because it is the best idea, but because organizational gravity pulls everyone toward the Highest Paid Person’s Opinion. This is the HiPPO effect, and it is the single greatest killer of innovation in companies that otherwise have plenty of talent and ambition.

The HiPPO does not win because people are cowardly. It wins because convergent thinking, the instinct to evaluate, judge, and narrow, kicks in before divergent thinking has had room to breathe. Someone proposes an idea, and immediately the room starts stress-testing it: “That would cost too much.” “Operations would never go for it.” “We tried something like that three years ago.” Each of those responses might be valid, but their timing is catastrophic. They shut down the generative process before it has produced anything worth evaluating.

The Diamond model solves this by making the separation explicit and structural. First you go wide. Then you go narrow. Never both at once.

 

The Left Side: Divergent Ideation

The divergent phase is where most organizations underinvest. Not because they lack creative people, but because they lack a process that protects creative thinking from premature judgment.

In our Innovating Beyond Efficiency® process, the divergent phase uses several interlocking techniques to ensure that the full solution space gets explored before anyone starts narrowing.

Collaborative stakeholder conversations are conducted one-on-one, across functions, and at multiple levels of the organization. The goal is not to validate existing assumptions; it is to surface what people actually think, see, and worry about when they are not performing for the room. A warehouse manager’s frustration with a manual process often contains more innovation potential than a boardroom brainstorm. These interviews are deliberately structured to draw out problems, not solutions; the problem space is the raw material, and solutions come later.

Green-field gap analysis asks a deceptively simple question: if you were building this organization from scratch today, with no legacy systems, no existing contracts, no sunk costs, and no organizational inertia, what would you build? The gap between that green-field vision and today’s reality is the raw material for innovation. It strips away the gravitational pull of “we have always done it this way” and forces leaders to confront path dependence honestly. Most organizations are not broken; they are simply the accumulated product of their own history. The green-field exercise makes that visible.

Problem-space matrices map the full landscape of challenges, opportunities, and latent capabilities across the organization. Rather than starting with solutions (a technology trap that mid-market companies fall into constantly), this technique starts with the problem space and ensures that no significant area goes unexplored. It is the difference between fishing in one spot and surveying the entire lake before casting a line.

Structured brainstorming with explicit ground rules rounds out the divergent thinking toolkit. The most important rule is also the most counterintuitive: no evaluation during ideation. Ideas get captured, not critiqued. The temptation to say “that would never work because…” is precisely the reflex that must be suppressed during this phase. There will be plenty of time for evaluation later; the Diamond’s whole point is to separate these two cognitive modes so each can operate at full strength.

One additional element that mid-market companies often underestimate: bringing in outside expertise during the divergent phase dramatically expands the solution space. Internal teams, no matter how talented, carry the same mental models and industry assumptions. They have been marinating in the same organizational context for years, and that context creates blind spots that no amount of internal brainstorming will overcome. An outsider matched to the organization’s industry and culture can introduce adjacent-possible ideas that insiders simply cannot see, because they are standing too close to the current reality. The key is ensuring that outside perspective aligns with the organization rather than disrupting it; innovation without cultural disruption is the goal.

The output of the divergent phase is not a recommendation. It is a comprehensive, unfiltered inventory of possibilities: problems worth solving, capabilities worth building, markets worth entering, inefficiencies worth eliminating, and technologies worth adopting. It is messy, expansive, and deliberately unconstrained.

 

The Right Side: Convergent Prioritization

If the divergent phase is about breadth, the convergent phase is about discipline. This is where the Diamond narrows, and it is where most organizations need the most help; not because convergence is conceptually difficult, but because most prioritization methods are either too simplistic to be useful or too complex to be actionable.

“Let’s rank these by ROI” sounds rigorous until you realize that nobody can reliably estimate the ROI of an initiative that has never been attempted. “Let’s vote” sounds democratic until the HiPPO effect reasserts itself in a different form. What mid-market organizations need is a framework that is simple enough to use in a working session, rigorous enough to withstand scrutiny, and honest enough to surface the real trade-offs.

Our convergent methodology, which we call Project Vista, scores every initiative from the divergent phase across three dimensions using t-shirt sizes: Benefits (the strategic and financial upside), Costs (the investment required), and Implementation Difficulty (a proxy for organizational complexity, cross-functional dependency, and span of control required to deliver). T-shirt sizes (S, M, L, XL) mapped to numerical values produce a composite score: Benefits divided by the product of Cost and Implementation Difficulty.

Two design choices make this approach work where simpler frameworks fail.

First, the benefit scale is deliberately nonlinear. The jump from Large to Extra-Large benefit is not incremental. An XL benefit represents a new revenue stream, a market repositioning, or a competitive moat; it is categorically more valuable than even a significant efficiency gain. The asymmetric scale ensures that genuinely transformative opportunities do not get buried by high implementation scores. Without this, the framework would systematically favor small, safe projects over the bolder bets that actually move the needle. We suggest a factor of 2-3 between each T-shirt size.

Second, and more importantly, the raw ranking is not the final output. Most prioritization frameworks score projects independently and then stack-rank them, as if an organization could simply execute them top to bottom. That ignores a binding constraint that mid-market companies face more acutely than anyone: leadership bandwidth is finite and non-fungible. You cannot solve a leadership bandwidth shortage by hiring a contractor the way you can solve a cost constraint by reallocating budget. A $200M company can realistically execute one XL-difficulty project at a time, plus a handful of smaller initiatives running with lighter oversight. Project Vista produces not just a ranked list but a sequenced portfolio that respects that constraint and allocates projects in the right order up to that limit. The output is a roadmap that accounts for what the organization can absorb, not just what it should want.

That sequencing discipline extends to what gets deferred. A roadmap that tries to do everything is not a roadmap; it is a wish list. The discipline of convergent prioritization is as much about what you choose not to do as what you choose to pursue. Saying “not yet” to a good idea is one of the hardest things a leadership team can do, and it is one of the most important.

 

The Hinge Point

The moment between divergent and convergent is the most critical transition in the entire process. It is the widest point of the Diamond; the moment when the full inventory of possibilities sits on the table and the organization pivots from generating to evaluating. Get this transition wrong and you lose the value of everything that came before it.

The most common failure mode is premature convergence: the team gets impatient, the CEO picks three favorites, and the remaining ideas get swept aside without rigorous evaluation. The second most common is indefinite divergence (or “analysis paralysis”): the team keeps generating, keeps exploring, keeps adding ideas to the board, and never makes the psychological shift to committing resources. Both are organizational reflexes, and both must be avoided purposefully.

In practice, we mark this transition explicitly. The divergent phase has a defined endpoint when we have a consolidated full inventory of ideas and assignments made to the right stakeholders to T-shirt size the Benefits, Costs, and Difficulty of each. The team acknowledges that the inventory is as complete as it will get, and then the rules of engagement change. Evaluation is now not only permitted but required. Tough questions are not premature; they are the point. The same people who were encouraged to suspend judgment an hour ago are now expected to exercise it with full rigor. The Diamond demands both modes, but never at the same time.

 

Where the Diamond Meets Execution

The prioritized portfolio coming out of the Diamond maps directly onto a phased execution framework that’s sized to the organization’s tech span-of-control limit. Stabilizing projects (replacing outdated systems) and Optimizing projects (integration and efficiency features) typically rise to the top first, both because of their direct impact and because they reduce the investment needed for everything that follows.

Once an organization’s tech is running on a stabilized, optimized platform, Monetizing projects tend to rise to the top of the list, e.g. revenue-generating capabilities, new products, and market-facing innovations. This is not because they matter least, but because they require the stable, optimized foundation that the earlier phases create, and their Cost estimates are far too high until those prerequisite capabilities bring the investment down (raising the ROI by dropping the magnitude of the “I”).

This is the connection that most innovation processes miss entirely. They generate ideas, maybe even prioritize them, and then hand a list to the operating team with a cheerful “good luck.” The Diamond model is designed from the start to produce output that maps onto real execution phases with realistic resource assumptions. The point was never to have a good brainstorm. The point was to build a bridge from “what could we do?” to “here is what we will do, in this order, starting Monday.”

 

The Real Competitive Advantage

The companies that win in the mid-market over the next decade will not be the ones with the best technology. Technology is increasingly commoditized; the tools available to a $300M company today would have been unimaginable for a Fortune 500 company a decade ago. The competitive advantage belongs to the organizations that can systematically identify the broadest possible set of opportunities and then converge on the highest-impact investments with speed and discipline. Answers are so easy now; the quality of an organization’s questions has risen far above its ability to develop answers in determining the odds that it will survive and thrive in the AI era.

That is not lightning. It is a process. And it is a process that any organization can learn, adopt, and repeat; which is precisely what makes it so powerful.